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‘We’re doing spectacle. Spectacle costs money.’
James Cameron, interviewed during the production of Titanic
 (Parisi 1998, 137)
 

James Cameron’s 1997 blockbuster, Titanic, constitutes a problem for critical writing on cinema, offering to film theorists an implicit challenge to account for its exceptional status. The film warrants consideration simply because of its enormous commercial success, but the excessive scale of its production and reception also presents certain interesting obstacles to its critical or aesthetic appreciation. Critics and reviewers have claimed to be mystified by the attraction of ‘a special effects romp with laughable dialogue’ and this essay will explore this shortfall in critical response, since it highlights a blind spot in academic and journalistic discourses of film which are unable to account for the cinematic spectacle of Titanic as anything other than a reprehensible device for audience manipulation (Jones 1998, 10). José Arroyo’s account of the film, for instance, published shortly after its release, treats Titanic as representative of the decadence of contemporary commercial cinema that emphasises motion and spectacle at the expense of character and story. Thus, while Arroyo judges Titanic to be ‘among the best big-budget films of the past year’, he also asserts that it is nevertheless a bad film:
Character and stories are now most often the domain of lower-budget films […] Generally […] the only thing big-budget Hollywood currently does well is action and effects – that is, only through action and effects does big-budget Hollywood have anything to say. It is because of its lack of story-telling skills and its execrable character delineation that Titanic is exemplary of contemporary Hollywood action/spectacle – it is also because of this that it is not a good film (Arroyo 1998, 19). 
While more considered, less evaluative, critical writing on Titanic has emerged since the film’s release, the tendency has been to regard the phenomenon of the film and its success with some anxiety, as a problem, an anomaly that must be ‘accounted for’ and explained in order to return it to its correct place on the critical balance sheet.​[1]​ Vivian Sobchack, for example, opens an essay on the thematics of depth in Titanic with the question, ‘How can we possibly account in a truly compelling way for the monumental popularity and emotional impact of James Cameron’s Titanic?’ (Sobchack 1999, 189). I want here not to propose a definitive answer to that question, but rather to consider how it might be approached from a different angle, one that does not require us to assess the film in terms of conventional measures of value. I want to suggest instead that a reading of Georges Bataille’s work on economics, expenditure and excess offers a way of thinking about cinema that does not return us to problematic oppositions between, for instance, ‘spectacle’ on the one hand, and ‘story-telling’ or narrative on the other, or to dubious evaluative models. Bataille’s concept of general economy, which takes as its central premise the assumption that cultural, social and biological systems are organized by a principle of excess or non-productive expenditure, suggests a way of ‘accounting’ for the commercial success of the film. It also provides the basis for the formulation of a different critical model of cinema, which can reconcile its economic and aesthetic functions, rather than holding them irrevocably apart. 

I make murals, not paintings. It’s my responsibility to be the throttle. It’s the studio’s to be the brakes. 
James Cameron (Cameron 1998) 






We can ignore the fact that the ground we live on is little other than a field of multiple destructions. Our ignorance only has this incontestable effect: It causes us to undergo what we could bring about in our own way, if we understood. It deprives us of the chance of an exudation that might suit us (Bataille 1991a, 23-4).

This passage identifies a central premise of Georges Bataille’s concept of ‘general economy’: that in the industrialized West we have been blinded to the violent dynamics of the cultural and economic systems that organize our lives. This blindness derives from our tendency to understand such systems in terms of the limited rational frameworks of classical economic thought. Bataille argues that a general economic model provides us with a far more accurate historical descriptor of the unstable basis of social and cultural systems than does classical economics. For Bataille the consequences of thinking outside conventional critical frameworks are multiple, extending as far as the practice of international politics; among the implications of the quotation above is the suggestion that wars are extreme instances of a general systemic tendency towards the destruction of excess resources, and that recognition of this principle might enable us to avoid such devastating events by better management of resource-consumption. Such a rethinking offers an interesting new critical perspective for thinking about cinema: it enables us to think of its function not only in terms of the generation of profits, but also in terms of the often massive and sometimes utterly catastrophic, dissipation of resources.
For a classical economist ‘the economic problem arises because individuals’ wants are virtually unlimited, whilst the resources available to satisfy those wants are scarce’ (Hardwick, Langmead and Khan 1999, 4). In contrast with this premise, Bataille argues that the key question for the study and management of any social, biological or, by implication, textual system is not resource-scarcity but how the system disposes of an excess of resources. His three-volume work, The Accursed Share (La Part Maudite) addresses how and why an excess of resources should be regarded as an urgent problem for contemporary society. In the preface to the first volume Bataille claims that, in considering the problem of excessive resources, the book engages with:
a problem that still has not been framed as it should be, one that may hold the key to all the problems posed by every discipline concerned with the movement of energy on the earth – from geophysics to political economy, by way of sociology, history and biology. Moreover, neither psychology nor, in general, philosophy can be considered free of this primary question of economy. Even what can be said of art, of literature, or poetry, has an essential connection with the movement I study, that of excess energy translated into the effervescence of life (Bataille 1991a, 10).
The reversal undertaken by Bataille in substituting the term ‘excess’ for ‘scarcity’ is highly suggestive since, in proposing an alternative general economic metaphor, it highlights the centrality of classical economic metaphors to a wide range of disciplines. Outlining the field of relevance for this work, Bataille writes that general economy offers a broad framework for criticism, claiming that ‘what can be said of art, of literature, or poetry, has an essential connection with the movement I study, that of excess energy translated into the effervescence of life’” (ibid.). This essay will consider whether cinema can instructively be added to that list of practices. 
We might tend to assume that the fundamental economic problems facing us are those of how basic needs, such as the need for food or shelter, might be satisfied by amassing resources. However, Bataille insists that the more pressing economic problem is how we ‘spend’ or consume an excess of resources: ‘it is not necessity but its contrary, “luxury,” that presents living matter and mankind with their fundamental problems’ (Bataille 1991a, 12). He argues that the centrality of this problem, how to dispose of an excess of resources, is revealed through a shift of perspective away from the ‘restricted’ view of classical economics to the universal perspective of a general economics. For example, he contends that:
the economy is never considered in general […] Economic science merely generalizes the isolated situation; it restricts its object to operations carried out with a view to a limited end, that of economic man. It does not take into consideration a play of energy that no particular end limits: the play of living matter in general, involved in the movement of light of which it is the result (ibid 23).
Behind this critique of economic science’s narrowly anthropocentric perspective is not simply a challenge to the methodological assumptions of economics but a proposal for a radically different ethical perspective on economics. Bataille claims that: ‘Changing from the principles of restrictive economy to those of general economy actually accomplishes a Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking – and of ethics’ (ibid 25). He thus proposes an ethics of excess that would not only re-orient critical systems from a range of academic fields, but could also serve as a guiding principle for individuals and institutions, for the disposal of excess resources. 
The most urgent question for Bataille is how to manage a constant excess of energy and resources, since periodically there comes a point in the cycle of any biological/economic/social system when pressure from the accumulation of this excess must be vented. He explains this with the example of an organism in constant receipt of energy, which fuels its growth. When it reaches the limits of its growth, or if it receives more energy than is necessary to drive its growth, the excess energy, or ‘wealth’, is necessarily wasted. As Bataille notes, ‘if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically’ (ibid 21).
This suggests, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the central function of economic exchange is not necessarily to get a return, but may be the ‘wastage’ of resources. As he acknowledges, it is understandable that conventional economic thought should have misunderstood the importance of waste:
Why would [classical economy] have thought that in the beginning a mode of acquisition such as exchange had not answered the need to acquire, but rather the contrary need to lose or squander? (ibid 67).
Among the many implications of Bataille’s argument is that recognizing the necessity of squander enables the employment of a more ethical and desirable means of ‘waste-management’. ‘[T]he present state of the world,’ Bataille asserts, ‘is defined by the unevenness of the […] pressure exerted by human life’ and the consequent inequitable distribution of resources around the globe (ibid 39-40). He argues that general economy suggests this imbalance should be corrected through the transfer of wealth from the ‘developed world’ to developing countries with no expectation of a return on this expenditure. The principles of general economy thus have a directly political function for Bataille, as well as perhaps altering the way we understand the mechanisms and subjective experience of contemporary capitalism. His argument implies, compellingly, continuity from the institutionalized or conventionalized squander of sacrifice and potlatch in previous societies, to contemporary equivalent acts or practices. The connection between ritual destruction and the ‘creative’ arts is made more explicitly in an essay on expenditure from the early 1930s where Bataille is beginning to formulate general economic principles, and identifies the following examples of: 
so-called unproductive expenditure: luxury, mourning, war, cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, perverse sexual activities (i.e., deflected from genital finality) – all these represent activities which, at least in primitive circumstances, have no end beyond themselves (Bataille 1991b, 118).
This assertion that sacrifice, war, the building of vast monuments, grief, eroticism and art all serve a similar function, invites us to think about the functions and attractions of cultural activity and, in particular, cinema, in relation to a general economic logic. This is not to say that cinema is equivalent to, or continuous with these other practices, but it is to suggest that there may be similarities in terms of their social function.
Human sacrifice is perhaps the most intense (or disturbing) example of ritualistic consumption or ‘so-called unproductive expenditure’.​[5]​ As Bataille, writes, ‘One could not go further in the desire to consume the life substance. Indeed, one could not go more recklessly than this’ (Bataille 1992, 61). Human sacrifice is an important figure for him since it exemplifies the way in which an act of apparently senseless destruction can assume sacred significance through ritual practices and, more generally, the way in which such squandering of a community’s own (most valuable human) resources can paradoxically become the point around which that community coheres: ‘and if I thus consume immoderately, I reveal to my fellow beings that which I am intimately. Consumption is the way in which separate beings communicate’ (Bataille 1991a, 58).​[6]​ In other words, a destructive act such as sacrifice is ritualized through its framing by a legitimating mythic narrative (and vice versa), and this myth then functions as the articulation of cultural identity and a common frame of reference for members of that community. Bataille understands sacrifice here as a representation, the visual spectacle of death or destruction, so that sacrifice is at once an act of killing and also the public performance of that action that forces an awareness of the imminence of her/his own death upon the spectator. 
Thus for Bataille, it is essential to the meaning of such acts of apparently unproductive consumption as sacrifice and potlatch that they are viewed. Without a spectator such acts remain senseless. He identifies parallels between these acts and literature and drama, ‘the classic subterfuges, performances, or books, to which the masses have recourse’ (Bataille 1990, 20). These texts allow us repeatedly to observe and (imaginatively) experience death by ‘identifying with some character who dies, and […] believing that we die, although we are alive’ (ibid.). He regards this cultural activity, the participation in rites and performances, as that which defines us as human.
Bataille’s conceptualization of sacred rites, then, holds that such acts are arresting spectacular performances for an audience on a large scale. Such performances involve an identificatory relationship with the viewer who is invited to identify with a character or object within the performance. Thus, sacrifice and popular cultural texts and events have equivalent functions as narrative performances that invite the spectator’s identification through the shocking, transgressive or sensually pleasurable spectacle of death or consumption. 
There is, in other words, a structural similarity between the experience of witnessing a sacrifice, in Bataille’s account, and the experience of viewing of a film. I would argue that an acknowledgement of this similarity allows us to rethink the experience and function of contemporary cinema, and that cinema, in turn, serves as a particularly illuminating figure for exploring the adaptability of Bataille’s concept of general economy as a critical model. His work does suggest parallels between the increasing orientation of the twentieth century towards convenience and leisure through the growth of the tertiary or service industries: ‘Ancient societies found relief in festivals; some erected admirable monuments that had no useful purpose; we use the excess to multiply “services” that make life smoother’ (Bataille 1991a, 24). However, he is reluctant to trace a trajectory from earlier societies of consumption through to the present, because of his assumption that industrialization and the establishment of the bourgeoisie constitutes a radical historical break. This break is constituted by the formation of a society of production formed around the rational values of utility. 
The problem with this argument, as Jean-Joseph Goux argues in his essay, ‘General Economics and Postmodern Capitalism’, is the extent of the success Bataille ascribes to capitalism in banishing unproductive expenditure from contemporary experience (even if it cannot totally free itself from the principles of general economy) (Goux, 1990). Bataille buys into the myth of capitalism’s ability to appropriate and process everything it comes into contact with. This serves the purposes of an argument that attacks the ethical basis of capitalism, but perhaps disregards Bataille’s own acknowledgement of the necessary inseparability of wasteful and productive expenditure wherein:
real life, composed of all sorts of expenditures, knows nothing of purely productive expenditure; in actuality, it knows nothing of purely non-productive expenditure either’ (Bataille 1991a, 12).
Thus, while Goux accepts that the opposition between the sacred and the profane, which Bataille identifies as the structuring force in societies of consumption such as that of the Aztecs, no longer holds in contemporary (Western) society, he also observes that ‘advanced capitalism seems to exceed the principle of restricted economy and utility that presided at its beginning. No society has “wasted” as much as contemporary capitalism’ (Goux 1990, 210). In this respect, the concept of general economy is thoroughly appropriate as a tool for thinking about the status and attractions of contemporary cinema. Considered in relation to general economy, we might conclude that Titanic consists of a series of expenditures oriented primarily around the spectacle of destruction at various levels rather than simply a project that was mis-handled by Fox and Paramount studios, and which over-ran its initial budget by 66% due to the unprecedented scale and technical complexity of the undertaking. 
What is at stake in this reading of Bataille is a critical reorientation, a shift of focus away from a restricted critical perspective on cinema, which is underpinned by certain ideological and economic assumptions, towards an expanded or general perspective in which cinema, from avant-garde film-making through to major studio productions, is understood as a field of wasteful and non-productive expenditure. As with any field of critical thought, (classical) economic metaphors abound in discussions of films as a means of articulating concepts: references to narrative economies, aesthetic economies, economies of desire, fields of excess and extravagance, and the notion of cinema as a machine for efficiently delivering the pleasurable experience of identification are common within Film Studies, as are assumptions about the causal relationship between the industrial character of much film production and the form of its products. 
Film theory has tended to understand the formal and ideological structure of films in terms of an opposition between narrative and ‘excess’,​[7]​ holding that excessive components such as obtrusive cinematography, direct address or the casting a star against type function to disrupt the flow of the narrative. The formal and ideological unity of the film text is disturbed, and this interferes with our identification with, or absorption in, the narrative.​[8]​ Film theorists have conventionally assumed that such excessive elements are contained by the formal systems of classical cinema such as continuity editing, or are consigned to supposedly ‘minor’ genres of film such as the musical, the women’s picture, fantasy or horror cinema, or avant-garde films that consciously disregard formal conventions in order to subvert them. A critical approach to film prompted by a reading of general economy, however, involves an inversion of these oppositional terms, treating excess as central to the formal systems of cinema, rather than as antagonistic or degrading, and understands it not merely in terms of literal expenditure but also in terms of formal expenditures. The value of Titanic as an illustration, then, is its hyper-visibility. Both in its historical ‘visibility’ and its foregrounding of spectacular and excessive images, it makes particularly visible the relationship between film production as excessive expenditure, and the formal excesses of a film text.
While Bataille’s influence on recent European critical thought has been such that Annette Michelsen referred disparagingly in 1999 to ‘a veritable Bataille industry, developing over the past decade’, his ideas have had little impact within the field of film theory (Michelsen 1999). While some writers have attempted to put these ideas to work in the service of film analysis – most notably in Steven Shaviro’s work on the spectatorial experience of cinema​[9]​ – in general, reference to Bataille’s thought has been restricted to work on ‘extreme’ or ‘transgressive’ genres of film: surrealist and avant-garde cinema, horror and pornography. This is a surprising omission, perhaps, but, other than a few passing generalizations about American cinema and a handful of marginal references to Sergei Eisenstein, Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalì, Bataille’s own writing makes barely any reference to cinema. 
Jean-François Lyotard’s 1973 essay ‘Acinema’ is one of the earliest examples of film theory that attempts to engage with general economy, although it does so without any mention either of Bataille or of the term. Lyotard conceptualizes a dissipated alternative cinema of inaction and play, of movement and intensities, consisting of films that are ‘fortuitous, dirty, confused, unsteady, unclear, poorly framed, overexposed’ (Lyotard 1989, 169). He suggests, in terms resembling Bataille’s, that the pleasure of film-viewing is akin to a simple aesthetic delight in destruction. For Lyotard, the spectator’s pleasure is derived from the spectacle of the waste or non-productive expenditure of resources. 
Lyotard places emphasis on the abstract formal qualities of a film and insists upon the economic function of these formal elements in a very broad sense as well as in a restricted, commercial sense. In this analysis, a mainstream or narrative film operates according to (and supports) a productive régime, rather than a régime of consumption, both at the level of textual organization, and at the closely related level of the film’s commercial viability. Noting the root meaning of the term, ‘cinematography’ as ‘the inscription of movement, a writing with movement, a writing with movements’, Lyotard suggests that a commercial film is constructed through the careful, sequential organization of certain movements selected from among countless others. Within this narrative structure, no movement registers merely as motion (in so far as this is possible), ‘a simple sterile difference in an audio-visual field’ (ibid 170). Instead, all movements have a productive function within a linear narrative sequence, with one movement causing or introducing another. The function or value of such movements within the film’s narrative economy is that they produce a steady narrative progression and consequently, Lyotard concludes, ‘The only genuine movement with which cinema is written is that of value’ (ibid 170).
Lyotard employs an expanded notion of economy and, like Bataille, is concerned with exploring an economic logic of consumption or ‘sterile motion’, which he associates with a cinema of off-cuts and accident, rather than a productive logic. He explains the concept of ‘sterile motion’ with an example that serves as a metaphor both for film-making and film-viewing:
A match once struck is consumed. If you use the match to light the gas that heats the water for the coffee which keeps you alert on your way to work, the consumption is not sterile, for it is a movement belonging to the circuit of capital: merchandise-match  merchandise-labour  power  money-wages  merchandise-match. But when a child strikes the match-head to see what happens – just for the fun of it – he enjoys the movement itself, the changing colours, the light flashing at the height of the blaze, the death of the tiny piece of wood, the hissing of the tiny flame. He enjoys these sterile differences leading nowhere, these uncompensated losses; what the physicist calls the dissipation of energy (ibid 170-1).
Here sterile motion is framed as the consumption or dissipation of energy, a movement that deviates from, or breaks out of, the circuit of capital. In the example above, this transgression is presented as a pleasurable movement. Lyotard goes on to link the child’s aesthetic delight in the (taboo) spectacle of destruction to sexual pleasure (jouissance). Referring to Freud’s writing on ‘“normal” genital sexuality’, Lyotard observes that jouissance, like other intense enjoyments, might be characterized as perverse insofar as it is not solely tied to procreation but may be sought for its own sake, sex as mis-spent or unproductively consumed energy/labour (ibid 171).
And so, the child fascinated by fire is presented as an agent of non-productive consumption. In this light, the (male) child also represents, for Lyotard, an archetypal artist. The act of lighting a match is read by Lyotard as the production of a (decomposing) representation of destruction and crucially it is a representation that is not commodified, that is removed from the circuit of capital: 
He produces, in his own movement, a simulacrum of pleasure in its so-called ‘death-instinct’ component. Thus if he is assuredly an artist by producing a simulacrum, he is one most of all because this simulacrum is not an object of worth valued for another object […] On the contrary, it is essential that the entire erotic force invested in the simulacrum be promoted, raised, displayed and burned in vain (ibid 171).
While Lyotard’s essay is concerned with artistic practice and, in particular, with film-making, this account of a child’s pleasure at the spectacle of destruction also offers an account of the spectatorial pleasures of cinema: the child ignites the match in order to watch it burn, ‘to see what happens’ (ibid 170). 
This account lends itself well to thinking about the structural logic and aesthetics of a wide range of cinematic genres, demonstrating a way in which the concept of general economy may be put to work critically. Lyotard’s essay is primarily concerned with commercially resistant forms of cinema, drawing a distinction between commercial cinema and experimental cinema that is treated as so self-evident that it does not require any further elaboration or qualification. However, from the perspective of general economic theory, and by the logic Lyotard himself employs, this distinction becomes unsustainable. While a work of art (or anti-art) might be understood as resistant to commodification, it nevertheless retains an economic function in general terms. A successfully non-commercial film, for example, which guarantees minimal or no returns, can be considered to be the trace/result of a non-productive expenditure of energy and resources. It is a luxury item, removed from the circuit of capital (due primarily to its ‘difficulty’, but also to its practical inaccessibility), with little ‘useful’ function. It is an instance of over-production, an item made with a more or less deliberate disregard for demand.
In this respect, an avant-garde film serves a more or less identical function to a commercially oriented film produced on a multi-million dollar budget. As Goux notes above, industrial and cultural production in a postmodern capitalist economy may be characterized by over-production and the superabundance of products that have no use. Therefore, in general economic terms, what distinguishes an experimental film from an action film produced by a major Hollywood studio at the cost of scores of millions of dollars is primarily the scale of the expenditure of resources involved in their production. As potlatch on a grand scale, Hollywood films offer us high-impact examples of pyrotechnic cinema at its most visible and culturally significant. 
To return to Titanic, the value of this film as a case study in cinema as ‘non-productive expenditure’ is redoubled by the subject matter of the film. It recounts a story of pointless but tragically inevitable waste. ‘The shipwreck of the Titanic’, Slavoj Zizek has observed, 
made such a tremendous impact, not because of the immediate material dimensions of the catastrophe, but because of its symbolic overdetermination, because of the ideological meaning invested in it. It was read as a ‘symbol,’ as a condensed, metaphorical representation of the approaching catastrophe of European civilisation (Žižek 1991, 203).
The readiness to attribute such meaning to the event stemmed, Žižek suggests, from the fact that the disastrous sinking had already been rehearsed. As evidence, Žižek cites a passage from the foreword of Walter Lord’s factual account of the events of 14 April 1912, A Night to Remember, wherein Lord discusses Morgan Robertson’s 1898 novel, Futility, which, incredibly, concerns the sinking of the Titan, the largest and most luxurious liner that had ever been constructed, after it hit an iceberg in the Atlantic one night in April. As Lord explains, the coincidences between real and fictional events are remarkable: The Titanic
was 66,000 tons displacement; Robertson’s was 70,000. The real ship was 882.5 feet long; the fictional one was 800 feet. Both vessels were triple screw and could make 24-25 knots. Both could carry about 3000 people, and both had enough lifeboats for only a fraction of this number. But, then, this didn’t seem to matter because both were labelled “unsinkable” (Lord 1997, xi-xii).
The sinking of the Titan is figured in Robertson’s novel as a symbolic disaster, perhaps articulating fin-de-siècle anxiety about the demise of civilized Victorian society in a similar way to the manner in which Cameron’s Titanic articulates millennial disenchantment with grand narratives of emancipation through progress. The Titan is the sign of arrogant and misplaced faith in technology and a metaphor for (or symptom of) the untenability of a nineteenth century image of a stable, well-ordered and hierarchized society. The fictional event then, already has an allegorical dimension, one that is replayed in the sinking of the real ship. The sinking of the Titanic was, therefore, already a repetition. 
Žižek uses this example to illustrate the paradoxical character of the symptom, the real meaning or truth of which is only determined retrospectively. In other words, the symptom, which is the effect of a traumatic experience, precedes the cause, since it is only later, in analysis, that the traumatic event is excavated, constructed and inserted into a narrative. Thus, he notes, while ‘it is already a commonplace to read the Titanic disaster as a symptom in the sense of a “knot of meanings”’, the shocking event is symptomatic in a more specific sense: 
the point is that precisely as a shock, this sinking arrived at its proper time – ‘the time was waiting for it,’ even before it actually happened, there was already a place opened, reserved for it in fantasy-space. It had such a terrific impact upon the ‘social imaginary’ precisely because it was expected (Žižek 1991, 202).
The sinking confirmed a sense that an inevitable crisis was approaching, but to return to a general economic framework, one of the most significant features in Žižek’s mapping of a psychoanalytic schema onto historical events, is the emphasis upon repetition. Reframing the representations of the Titanic’s sinking in terms of general economy, we might understand the sinking as a moment of spectacularly excessive and wasteful expenditure. As Žižek notes, the sinking was almost pre-planned, rehearsed or scripted, and in this sense we might understand it as an event that corresponds to the rituals of spectacular expenditure discussed by Bataille in relation to cultures of consumption. Moreover, we might understand the film itself, as a further repetition of this repeatedly restaged event, as having a ritual dimension in relaying or transmitting a mythic narrative, one that resonates beyond cinematic genres. Since a ritual typically consists of a mythic narrative that recounts some originary event, the ritual is thus structured as a restaging or repetition of this event. There are clear and significant structural correspondences between the social function of rituals and mythic narratives and the film’s embodiment and thematization of expenditure.
Thus, the restaging or re-presentation of the sinking constituted by Cameron’s film can be understood as akin to a ritual repetition, with Titanic situated as one further entry in a series of ritual expenditures. His subsequent large-format documentary films seem to confirm the serial status of the film, as if Cameron is constantly remaking the same film with minor differences, such as the technical extravagances of Imax or 3D. Ghosts of the Abyss (2002), documents a series of further dives to investigate the wrecked ship, while Expedition: Bismarck (2002) records a similar expedition to study the carcass of the German battleship. Aliens of the Deep (2005) dispenses with the pretext of a wreck in order to explore sea-floor hydrothermal vents. Using as a base the Russian oceanographic research ship that features in Titanic, the films return us again and again to the abyssal site of the event, immersing us repeatedly in the unearthly depths. 
Titanic (following the many other films of the disaster) may, then, be read as a successive re-staging of a sacrificial event. The emphasis on the immensity of the project in the publicity and promotional material accompanying the film’s release, prepares the audience for Cameron’s film to witness a splendidly wasteful moment. Although the film was marketed as a melodrama with a classical class-transgressing, heterosexual romance narrative (with allusions to the Bette Davis vehicle, Now, Voyager, (Rapper, 1942)), this is outweighed by the narrative emphasis on the sinking of the ship and also by public knowledge of the historical events, both apparent in the teaser poster which publicized the film’s release (a close-up of the ship’s riveted hull with the film’s title painted on the metal and the caption ‘Collide With Destiny’). 
We know that the ship sank, but even supposing we didn’t, the film opens with a present-day salvage attempt on the ship as a prologue, and throughout the body of the narrative (presented in flashback) we are reminded repeatedly by various characters that it is unsinkable. Most of the film is spent introducing us to the ship in exquisitely authentic detail and then taking us through the ship’s destruction with a similarly loving attention to detail. This emphasis on intricate and authentic detail prepares the audience for the splendour of its imminent destruction and heightens the pleasure of that spectacle. Thus the anticipation of the sinking overwhelms and frames all other events within the narrative. It is also consistent that the film positions itself as melodrama due to the expressive and symbolic primacy of mise-en-scène that is particular to this genre. Film melodrama constructs locations, sets, costumes and props all function as exteriorizations of the characters’ internal turbulence and desires, and so foregrounds precisely those elements of the image and diegetic space whose function is to be destroyed. 
The authenticity of the film’s production design has been much publicized and a great deal of promotional material and pre-release magazine and television features stressed the pains taken to produce a convincing replica of the ship. The effect is that the spectator’s attention is redirected towards the film’s splendid and sensuous ornamentation in its staging of the Titanic’s opulent and extravagant microcosmic Edwardian society. According to Cameron: 
A rigorous philosophy of absolute correctness permeated every department, from Set design and Construction through Decorating, Props, Wardrobe, Hairdressing and Visual Effects. In addition to how things looked, every nuance of behaviour had to be examined. How people moved, how they spoke, their etiquette, how the ship’s crew would have performed its routine and emergency duties...all these things had to be known before a single scene could be staged. (Cameron 1997, xii)
A particularly telling example of such gratuitous intricacy is found in the manufacture of the ashtrays for the first class smoking room, and china for the first class dining tables, all of which are decorated with the White Star Line logo, which is, of course, invisible on screen. The conventions of ‘realist’ film-making require no such assiduousness since plausibility is an effect produced by the employment of familiar conventions of staging. Few people in any audience would be able to identify macroscopic (let alone microscopic) historical inaccuracies or minor omissions in the mise-en-scène, and so commissioning the reproduction dining room carpets from their original manufacturer, is, in this regard, superfluous. 
More important than historical accuracy in rendering the mise-en-scène of Edwardian society – described by the film’s costume designer, Deborah Scott, as ‘an explosion of excess’ – is the extravagance of the cinematic mise-en-scène. The ‘wasted’ effort and expense of the design principle of absolute fidelity in constructing and dressing these sets and costuming and choreographing the actors seems to confirm that the principal economic function of this film is expenditure. It follows, too, that these fabulous studio constructions, like the ship whose operational life was only four days, were destroyed on their completion. Dedication to authenticity is motivated here not purely by a general concern for historical accuracy, verismilitude or diegetic plausibility, but also by a concern with heightening the aesthetic splendour of destruction, a specific concern with the accurate appearance of the mise-en-scène as it is being destroyed. Paula Parisi notes, for instance, that the walls of the grand staircase, which is destroyed in a spectacular single take as 90,000 gallons of water are dumped through the glass-domed roof, were constructed from hardwood rather than plaster as it was found that plaster didn’t splinter but simply collapsed when it was pounded by a large volume of water. Consequently, ‘The ornately carved wall paneling on the grand staircase is not typical movieland plaster of paris but oak. Real oak. Acres and acres of it, deck after deck’ (Parisi 1998, 127). Similarly, the chandeliers throughout the ship’s interior were made from crystal rather than plastic or Lucite, ‘so they would tinkle and tilt just so during the ship’s demise’ (Parisi 1998, 127). 
One way of thinking about the production of Titanic in order to frame it in terms of historical traditions, which can account for it, is as a ritual event, a repetition or re-enactment (albeit at the service of cinematic representation) of the ship’s destruction. The effort devoted to the construction of the sets suggests that the film is an attempt to repeat the event itself, to approach the dimensions of the disaster by building a set from the original plans and equal in size to the original ship. Our familiarity with the circumstances of the film’s production means that Cameron’s film becomes almost a document of this event, the restaged sinking of the Titanic.​[10]​ A key spectatorial pleasure is that of savouring the wrecking of this splendid construction on the Mexican coast, a pleasure inseparable from, and perhaps enhancing, the various pleasures derived from viewing the narrative representation of the original sinking. Whether or not a combination of miniatures, process shots, CGI shots and full-scale mock-ups could have been employed to render a plausible representation of the sinking ship, the resulting images would have lacked the dimension added by the knowledge, however fanciful, that the ship we watch being destroyed was actually destroyed (at least twice – once on a film set and once in the Atlantic in 1912). 
















^1	 Notes See Lubin 1999, and Sandler and Studlar 1999, Bergfelder and Street 2004, for examples.
^2	  The claim, or boast, that Titanic is uniquely expensive rarely acknowledges that this does not take into account inflation; Cleopatra (Mankiewicz, 1963), for example, cost $270m in today’s terms (Simpson 2001, 77). More important than the accuracy of this claim, however, is the importance attributed to the excessive costs, which themselves constitute an attraction for audiences.
^3	  It grossed $600.8 million in the U.S. and $1,234.6 million outside the U.S. (http://www.worldwideboxoffice.com/) 
^4	  Box Office Report ranks Titanic fifth after Gone With The Wind (Fleming, 1939), Star Wars (Lucas, 1977), The Sound of Music (Wise, 1965) and E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial (Spielberg, 1982). See http://www.boxofficereport.com/atbon/adjusted.shtml.
^5	  Human sacrifice is a theme that held a particular fascination for Bataille, to the point where the short-lived Secret Society of Acéphale he belonged to in the 1930s is rumoured to have planned a sacrifice. For anecdotal detail see Caillois in Bataille et al, 1995, 15. 
^6	  ‘Communication’ is understood in Bataille’s work not as the simple, functional transmission of information but as the intense and non-productive experience of the rupture of boundaries between individuals, and the loss of an individual’s subjectivity. At the same time it is central to human identity: ‘communication is a phenomenon which is in no way added on to Dasein, but constitutes it’ (Bataille 1988, 24).
^7	  See Thompson 1986, for a systematic definition of cinematic excess.
^8	  See Comolli and Narboni 1992, for a systematic ideological analysis of cinematic excess
^9	  See Shaviro 1993, in which he conflates film with sacrifice in order to argue that ‘film offers its viewers […] a Bataillean ecstasy of expenditure, of automutilation and self-abandonment – neither Imaginary plenitude nor Symbolic articulation, but the blinding intoxication of contact with the Real’ (Shaviro 1993, 54).
^10	  However, since it is the entire production process of Titanic that constitutes the wasteful event, the film is not merely a record of this, but may also be understood as a trace or remnant of this process.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